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Exemptions to the Disclosure
Requirements
DAVID L. RATNER*
I. Introduction
It would be nice, in a program like this, to be able to say
what the law in this area is at the moment, to describe what
changes the proposed Code would make, and to assess whether
the changes are beneficial. Unfortunately, the situation is much
more complex. The law is not so simple and does not lend itself
to such easy treatment. In order to better understand the impact
of the Code on the exemptive provisions, we must first examine
the origins and purposes of these exemptions. I will trace the
historical development of these exemptions;1 the drafting of the
Code' itself has been an important step in this development.
I would like to describe this development as having occurred
in several stages: the initial balance struck by the Congress in
1933, the narrowing of the exemptions over the years by the
courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Com-
mission's initial response to the suggestion of the Code about
thirteen years ago, the changes proposed by the Code, and the
current developments aside from the consideration of the Code.
In any scheme of disclosure regulation of securities offer-
* LL.B., 1955, Harvard Law School; A.B., 1952, Harvard University; Professor of
Law, Cornell Law School; formerly, Executive Assistant to Chairman, Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 1966-68; Chief Counsel, Securities Industry Study, U.S. Senate
Banking Committee, 1971-72.
1. The exemptions were originally enacted in 1933. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, §§
3(b), 4(l), 5(c), 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77d(2),
77c(a)(11) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
2. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (1978)(Proposed Official Draft). References in this speech are
to the 1978 proposed draft. Comparison will be made with the ALI FED. SEC. CODE
(1980)(Official Draft) where the changes in the latter version are significant. On Sept. 30,
1980, the Securities and Exchange Commission published, in an agency release, changes
to the 1980 draft which were agreed upon by Professor Loss and the Commission. SEC
Sec. Act Release No. 33-6242, 20 SEC Docket 1485 (1980) [hereinafter referred to and
cited as CODE RECOMMENDATION].
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ings, one of the most important balances struck is that between
the protection of investors, through requiring disclosure of all
the relevant information about the issuer and the terms of the
offering, and the burden on those attempting to finance a ven-
ture who must provide that information.3 This is a real conflict,
an important conflict, and one that is not easy to resolve. It has
been at the center of attention at every stage of development.
II. Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933
The 1933 Act4 starts with the somewhat startling proposi-
tion that every sale of a security by anybody must be registered
unless specifically exempted. The principal exemptions pro-
vided by Congress in 1933 were the exemption for transactions
not involving any public offering,O the exemption for intrastate
offerings 7 and the exemption for small offerings.' These are ex-
3. See generally Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure under the Securities Acts
and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MiAWm L. REv. 1471 (1979).
4. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 1-26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
5. Id. § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. §77e(c)(1976). Section 5(c) provides that
[ilt shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use of medium of any
prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been
filed as to such security ...
Section 4 exempts certain regulated transactions from the registration requirements
of section 5. Id. § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(1976). Also, section 3 exempts certain securities
from the provisions of the Act. Securities Act of 1933, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1976).
6. For the current version of this exemption, see Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15
U.S.C. § 77d(2)(1976).
7. For the current version of this exemption, see Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(11),
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11)(1976). This section provides that the Act shall not apply to a
security
which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single
State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing
business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within,
such State or Territory.
8. For the current version of this exemption, see Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 301, 94
Stat. 2291 (1980). This section provides that
(t]he Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations, and subject
to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add any class of secur-
ities to the securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the
enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in
the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small
amount involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue of
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emptions for the issuer itself or for the promoters of a company.
I am not going to focus on the exemptions for secondary trading
at this point.'
There are important differences among the three exemp-
tions. Unlike the exemptions for private offerings and intrastate
offerings, which are set forth in the 1933 Act itself and which are
self-executing, the exemption authorized by section 3(b) for
small offerings is administered by the Commission. The small
offerings exemption, then, is available only to the extent allowed
by the Commission's rules.
In 1933, Congress enacted these exemptions in the belief
that they provided appropriate relief to promoters of an enter-
prise who needed to raise money without going through the pro-
cess of disclosure with its attendant liabilities.10 It is interesting
that with the benefit of thirty-five years of experience the
draftsmen of the Code seem to have found these same three ex-
emptions to be appropriate today."
securities shall be exempted under this subsection where the aggregate amount at
which such issue is offered to the public exceeds $5,000,000.
In the original legislation, offers could be exempted if they did not exceed $100,000.
Securities Act of 1933, Ch. 38, § 3(b), 48 Stat. 76 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
77c(b)(1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The figure was raised by Congress several times; the
current figure, $5,000,000, was adopted by Congress on Oct. 21, 1980. An Act to Amend
the Federal securities laws to provide incentives for small business investment and other
purposes. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 301, 94 Stat. 2291 (1980).
9. Spencer, Issuer Registration and Distributions, 1 PACE L. REv. 299, 314 (1981).
10. For a discussion of the historical background of the 1933 Act exemptions, see
generally 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, 56-105 (1951).
11. The same three exemptions are found in the proposed Code. ALI FED. SEC.
CODE §§ 242, 512(e), 514(c)(1978). Section 514 exempts local distributions; a local distri-
bution is one which
(1) results in sales substantially restricted to persons who are residents of or
have their primary employment in a single State, or an area in contiguous States
(or a State and a contiguous foreign country) as that area is defined by rule or
order on consideration of its population and economic characteristics, and (2) in-
volves securities of an issuer that does business or proposes to do business prima-
rily in that State or area, regardless of where it is organized. Section 514(a)(1) is
not satisfied unless at least 95 percent of all the buyers holding of record at least
80 percent of the securities distributed are persons there described.
Id. § 514(a). Section 514(c) provides that "local distributions" are exempted from the
filing requirements applicable to offering statements except when the security is issued
by an investment corporation. Id. § 514(c).
The CODE RECOMMENDATION changes § 514(a) by substituting 95 percent for the pre-
sent 80 percent figure. CODE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 2, at 1492. See Casper, Fore-
word, 1 PACE L. REv. 279, 288 (1981).
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III. Narrowing the Exemptions
After 1933, there was a long period of interpretation and
elaboration of the exemptions. This process primarily occurred
in the 1950s and early 1960s as the securities markets and public
offerings became more active. The process of interpretation of
these three exemptions, by the courts12 and by the Commis-
A limited offering is not a "distribution" within the meaning of section 242(a) and is
therefore not subject to filing requirements. ALT FED. SEC. CODE § 242(a)(1978). A lim-
ited offering is defined as
one in which the following conditions are satisfied: (A) the initial buyers of the
securities are institutional investors or not more than thirty-five other persons or
both, or the seller reasonably so believes; (B) resales of any of the securities to
persons other than institutional investors within three years after the last sale (in
the sense of contract to sell) to any of the initial buyers other than institutional
investors do not result in more than thirty-five owners of those securities (apart
from any institutional investors and persons who become owners otherwise than
by purchase) at any one time, unless any such excess results from resales pursuant
to an offering statement or an exemption; and (C) the seller and all resellers com-
ply with any rules adopted under section 242(b)(4).
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b)(1978).
Section 512(e) exempts small offerings from registration as follows:
a transaction incident to an offering of not more than $100,000 [is exempt], except
that (1) the Commission, by rule with respect to any class of issuers, securities, or
offerings, may (A) reduce the amount to not less than $50,000 in any twelve-
month period or (B) impose conditions or withdraw this exemption when the of-
fering exceeds $50,000, and (2) this exemption does not apply to a transaction in a
security that was the subject of a limited offering within the one-year or three-
year period, as the case may be, specified in section 242(b).
Id. § 512(e). This section remains substantially the same in the 1980 draft except that §
512(e)(2) of the 1978 proposed Code was expanded in the 1980 draft to include resales as
well as limited offerings. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 512(5) (1980).
The CODE RECOMMENDATION increases the small offering exemption from $100,000 to
$200,000, and from $50,000 to $100,000. CODE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 2, at 1492.
12. See, e.g., Hillsborough Invest. Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960); Hill
York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); and Tabby's Int'l,
Inc. v. SEC, 479 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1973). The court in Hillsborough held that the
intrastate exemption does not apply to securities which, though proposed to be sold in-
trastate, are merely substitutes for unregistered securities sold earlier in violation of the
Securities Act. In Hill York, the court interpreted the private offering exemption in light
of the statutory purpose and concluded that since the Act, as remedial legislation, is
entitled to a broad construction, the exemptions must be narrowly viewed. The court
disavowed the use of arbitrary numerical tests in determining whether an offer is public
and stated agreement with the factors the Commission relies on: facts, circumstances and
policies embodied in the Act. In Tabby's Int'l, the court, in interpreting the monetary
ceiling of § 3(b) exemptions, found the permanent suspension of the exemption to be
proper where the offering was carried out by the underwriter in a fraudulent manner,
even though there was no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the issuer. The court
emphasized that the suspension was not punitive in nature but rather served the reme-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/4
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sion,3 was essentially as Professor Sowards has described in his
opening remarks.1 4  Various assumptions that had been
made-that certain offerings were private or intrastate or were
exempt because they were small-gradually became eroded.
This erosion resulted from the Commission's shift in posi-
tion on disclosure. I suppose it is a fact of administrative mo-
mentum or inertia that a certain mood takes hold of an agency.
In the case of the Commission, the balance between the need for
disclosure to protect investors and the need for some flexibility
to let people raise small amounts of money without the imposi-
tion of inordinate expenses and burdens was gradually moved
further and further toward the side of protection."5
This change came about in two ways. First, the actual dis-
closure requirements became more and more elaborate. Form S-
1,1' the basic form for registration, grew longer and longer. Each
amendment of the form added new categories of information.
One chairman of the Commission who had been a venture capi-
talist 7 expanded this form during his tenure to require informa-
tion that he decided a venture capitalist would need before in-
vesting. 8 Ideas of corporate responsibility took hold and found
their way into the disclosure requirements under the 1933 and
1934 Acts. Environmental disclosures have been incorporated
dial purpose of protecting investors.
13. These exemptions were all refined by the Commission, pursuant to its rule-mak-
ing authority, to provide more objective criteria in assessing claims for exemptions. Rule
146 was specifically tailored for businessmen raising capital under a section 4(2) exemp-
tion. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1980). Rule 147 deals with issues that involve local offerors
seeking to obtain financing for local enterprises through local offerees. 17 C.F.R. §
230.147 (1980). Rule 242 allows corporate issuers to raise small amounts of capital under
a section 3(b) exemption of the 1933 Act. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1980).
14. See Sowards, A Symposium on the Proposed Federal Securities Code: An In-
troduction, 1 PACE L. Rav. 291, 294-97 (1981).
15. See generally Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic
and Intrastate Offering Exemptions from Registrations for the Sale of Securities, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 622 (1974); Note, 82 YALE L.J. 1512 (1973).
16. The current text of the Form S-1 registration statement can be found at [1980] 2
FE. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 7121-29.
17. William J. Casey was Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
from 1971-1973.
18. Testimony in Commission proceedings revealed that venture capitalists consider
studies of market penetration, as well as facts about management performance, to be
important to their investment decisions. SEC Sec. Act Release Nos. 33-5313 & 34-9801,
37 Fed. Reg. 21,445 (1972).
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into the requirements."9
This expansion of disclosure requirements was combined
with a narrowing of the exemptions by the courts and the Com-
mission.20 The Commission concluded, after a number of fraudu-
lent offerings were uncovered, that exemptions which permitted
the sale of securities without adequate disclosure were danger-
ous because innocent investors could be hurt. The courts also
saw the most egregious cases, and in a series of decisions in the
early 1970s,1 narrowed the exemption for private offerings to
the point where many lawyers concluded that there really was
no longer any such exemption for private transactions. The only
private offerings which continued to enjoy the exemption were
either the standard debt offering to large institutions or an offer-
ing directly to the promoters of the venture.
This intrastate exemption, 2 drafted in 1933, probably was
19. Disclosure of this type is meant not only to indicate the future profitability of an
enterprise, but also to reveal the willingness of management to comply with legislation.
For example, Regulation S-K requires, among other things, the disclosure of a regis-
trant's efforts to comply with environmental regulations.
Appropriate disclosure shall also be made as to the material effects that compli-
ance with Federal, State and local provisions which have been enacted or adopted
regulating the discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise relating
to the protection of the environment, may have upon the capital expenditures,
earnings and competitive position of the registrant and its subsidiaries. The regis-
trant shall disclose any material estimated capital expenditures for environmental
control facilities for the remainder of its current fiscal year and its succeeding
fiscal year and for such further periods as the registrant may deem material.
17 C.F.R. § 229.20(c)(2)(iii) (1980).
20. See notes 12 & 13 supra.
21. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of S.C., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
The court in this case narrowly interpreted the private offering exemptive provisions and
held the issuer to a strict burden of proof. The issuer must sustain a burden of showing
affirmatively that there is no practical need for registration requirements and that the
public benefits to be derived from such requirements would be too remote. Id. at 157-61.
See also Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971). The
court held that the private offering exemption must be construed narrowly. See gener-
ally Rediker, The Fifth Circuit Cracks Down on Not-So-Private Offerings, 25 ALA. L.
REV. 289 (1973).
22. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11)(1976). This section pro-
vides an exemption for:
any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident
within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person
resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing
business within such State or Territory.
The exemption was designed to apply only to a local offering capable of being entirely
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/4
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prompted more by concern about whether Congress could regu-
late purely intrastate dealings than by a desire to provide a
needed exemption. This exemption has unique problems because
of the way it is drafted. Its principal problem is that a single
offer made to a person who in fact is a nonresident of the state
technically destroys the entire exemption. As a result of this sin-
gle inadvertent offer, the issuer has civil liability to all purchas-
ers, including all those who are in fact residents of the state. 8
The small offering exemption, which started off as a rela-
tively simple exemption for offerings of under $100,000, was re-
written during the 1950s by t&ne Commission, with the encour-
agement of the National Association of Securities Dealers,"' into
what is now Regulation A.2 5 That regulation is not so much an
exemption as a somewhat simplified form of registration for
small offerings.2
Over the years, then, there was a narrowing of all of these
exemptions to the point that the exemptions virtually disap-
peared. Knowledgeable people were either uncertain as to
whether the law permitted an offering without registration, or,
to the extent that they knew the law to be certain, knew that it
always said no.
effected within a single state or territory. To qualify for a section 77c(a)(11) exemption
the issuer (1) must offer and sell the securities only to persons resident within a single
state, and the issuer must also be resident within that state; (2) must conduct the pre-
dominant amount of his business within this same state; and (3) the business so con-
ducted must refer to the income producing operations of the business of which the secur-
ities are being sold. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 33-4434, 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961).
Rule 147 clarified the "doing business" requirement. The issuer is deemed to be
"doing business" in a state only if it is deriving at least 80% of its gross revenues from
the state; has at least 80% of its assets in the state; intends to use at least 80% of the
proceeds of the offering in the state; and has its principal office in the state. 17 C.F.R. §
230.147 (1980).
23. See, e.g., SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd
mem., 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977). The court found that offers to sell franchises in a
grocery delivery service were sales of investment contracts under the federal securities
laws. The defendant's attempt to use the intrastate exemption of § 3(a)(11) was rejected
because the franchise offers were not limited to New York state residents and at least
one had been sold to a New Jersey resident. Id. at 1243.
24. The National Association of Securities Dealers is an association that regulates
brokers and dealers.
25. Regulation A encompasses rules 251-264. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264 (1980).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(c)(1980).
19811
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IV. Administrative Response to the Code's Objectives
A project as ambitious and as complex as the Code obvi-
ously incorporates many different objectives. One important ob-
jective of the Code was to expand the area in which promoters
could make limited offerings to provide initial financing for a
new venture without going through the full disclosure proce-
dure.2 7 Another objective was to increase certainty as to the ap-
plicability of exemptions.2 8 These were some of the objectives
conveyed to the Commission in 1967 at a meeting which I was
privileged to attend. I was serving as Manuel Cohen's executive
assistant at the Securities and Exchange Commission when Ray
Garrett,2 9 Louis Loss 80 and Milton Cohen s came in to tell him
about the Code project.
The reaction of some of us at the Commission at that time
was that much of what the draftsmen of the Code were trying to
accomplish could be done administratively. Eventually, a com-
mittee under the chairmanship of Frank Wheat, who was then a
member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, produced
the rules in the 140 series,82 which were designed to meet some
of the Code objectives; in particular, the committee intended to
expand the exemptions for offerings without registration and to
provide more certainty in these areas. I think it is fair to say
that rule 144," dealing with secondary transactions, and rule
145,34 dealing with mergers, have been relatively useful and ef-
fective in dealing with the uncertainties in those two areas. Rule
146,3' dealing with private placements, and rule 147,36 dealing
27. See generally Loss, Keynote Address: The Federal Securities Code, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1431, 1437-40 (1979).
28. Id. at 1440-43.
29. Ray Garrett, Jr., who was Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
from 1973 to 1975 and Associate Executive Director of the Commission from 1954 to
1958, served as a consultant to the Federal Securities Code project.
30. Louis Loss, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard University,
served as the Reporter for the Federal Securities Code.
31. Milton H. Cohen was a member of the Advisory Committee of the Institutional
Investor Study for the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1969 to 1971, Director
of Special Study of the Securities Markets from 1961 to 1963, and also served as a con-
sultant to the Federal Securities Code project.
32. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144-.147 (1980).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1980).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1980).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1980).
[Vol. 1:319
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with intrastate offerings, which were both adopted in the early
1970s, have not been nearly as useful and effective.
The private offering exemption has always caused difficul-
ties. Rule 146 is an attempt to provide objective standards and
certainty in place of the very vague rules as to what constituted
a private placement.3 7 The rule managed to achieve the worst of
both worlds. It created new levels of complexity and, at the same
time, left areas of imprecision such as degrees of sophistication,
ability to bear the loss, reasonable grounds for belief, and so
forth.'s The rule is a lengthy series of traps. Unfortunately, un-
like some areas of securities law where it does not matter how
complex the law is because the people dealing with it are all spe-
cialists, this particular part of the law is designed for the people
who don't know anything about securities law, the ones who sim-
ply want to know whether they can raise some money without
complying with all the Commission's requirements. Rule 146 will
not enlighten them.
In the intrastate offering area, rule 147 simply added some
numerical tests to an exemption with which it was already diffi-
cult to comply;," I don't believe it enlarged the scope of the ex-
emption in any way. The rule did, however, add some certainty
by defining the "doing business standard" and clarifying the in-
36. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1980).
37. In Release No. 5487, Apr. 23, 1974, the Commission announced the adoption of
Rule 146. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 33-5487, 4 SEC Docket 154 (1974).
The Rule is designed to provide more objective standards for determining when
offers or sales of securities by an issuer would be deemed to be transactions not
involving any public offering within the meaning of Section 4(2) of the Act and
thus would be exempt from the registration provisions of the Act.
Id. at 155. See also the preliminary notes to the rule which state:
Rule 146 is designed to provide, to the extent feasible, objective standards upon
which responsible businessmen may rely in raising capital under claim of the Sec-
tion 4(2) exemption and also to deter reliance on that exemption for offerings of
securities to persons who need the protections afforded by the registration process.
17 C.F.R. Preliminary Note 3, § 230.146 (1980).
38. See generally Soraghan, Private Offerings: Determining "Access," "Investment
Sophistication," and "Ability to Bear Economic Risk," 8 SEc. Ro. L.J. 3 (1980);
Schwartz, Rule 146; The Private Offering Exemption-Historical Perspective and Anal-
ysis, 35 OHIo STATE L.J. 738 (1974).
39. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1980). The stated intention of rule 147 is to provide "more
objective standards" upon which businessmen may rely in claiming an exemption for an
intrastate offering. 17 C.F.R. Preliminary Note 3 § 230.147 (1980). See also note 23 and
accompanying text supra.
1981]
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trastate resale limitation. 40
Does the Code provide more reasonable standards? Does
the Code provide a degree of certainty that will be useful to peo-
ple trying to raise money without prohibitive disclosure bur-
dens? Strangely enough, the Code very much follows the present
patterns.
V. The Code Exemptions
I don't know whether the draftsmen actually concluded that
private offerings, intrastate offerings and small offerings were
the three appropriate types of exemptions, but these are the ex-
emptions we find in the proposed Code."
A. The Limited Offering Exemption
The successor to the private offering, the exemption for the
so-called limited offering, and the most important exemption in
the Code, is found in section 242.42 The Code proposal does pro-
vide an objective test which will ease the burden of compliance.
It exempts an offering made to thirty-five or fewer purchasers,
exclusive of institutions. An offering can be made to any number
of institutions (a term defined to include banks, insurance com-
panies, pension funds and others)" and up to thirty-five other
people without encountering disclosure requirements. This sec-
tion of the Code tilts the balance sharply in the direction of
nondisclosure.
I think, however, that there is a real question about the wis-
40. An issuer will be found to be "doing business" within a particular state or terri-
tory where it "derived at least 80% of its gross revenues and those of its subsidiaries on
a consolidated basis" from that state or territory. The issuer, however, must have had
"gross revenues in excess of $5,000 from the sale of products or services or other conduct
of its business for its most recent twelve month fiscal period" or the provision will not
apply. Also, "at least 80% of [the issuer's] assets and those of its subsidiaries on a con-
solidated basis [must be] located within such state or territory," and "the issuer (must]
intend to use and uses at least 80% of the net proceeds to [itself] from sales made pursu-
ant to this rule in connection with the operation of a business or of real property, the
purchase of real property located in, or the rendering of services within such state or
territory." 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (c)(2)(i)-(iii) (1980).
41. For the complete text of these three exemptions, see note 11 supra.
42. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 242 (1978). For the comparison with CODE RECOMMENDA-
TION, see note 11 supra. See also Casper, supra note 11, at 283.
43. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 275 (1978).
[Vol. 1:319
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dom of the numerical test the Code uses in this section. True, a
numerical test is easy. But, is it really responsive to the balanc-
ing of objectives to provide that an offering to not more than
thirty-five people should be exempt? Is it fair to cheat people so
long as you don't cheat more than thirty-five? It may be that a
somewhat more flexible approach may work better. A standard
that is flexible but provides certainty would be the optimum
solution.
B. The Intrastate Offering Exemption
At the beginning of their work, the draftsmen of the Code
eliminated the intrastate offering exemption completely on the
theory that it had too many traps in it to be worth keeping."
The exemption, however, has now reappeared as the exemption
for local distributions in section 514. 4" This, in effect, is the old
intrastate offering exemption with fringes. Instead of all offerees
having to be in the same state, the Code provides that as long as
95 percent of the purchasers buying at least 80 percent of the
securities are within a single state or within a geographical area
(which the Commission would have power to define), an offering
can be made without any disclosure or registration. 46
I am not sure the rationale for this change makes sense.
With a completely intrastate offering, at least you can justify the
exemption because the state will worry about regulating the of-
fer. The state can control the issuer and presumably protect its
own investors. Once you start crossing state lines, however, par-
ticularly if you are in an area like the New York metropolitan
area, you must ask if any state can effectively regulate such an
offering. If people can avoid disclosure requirements simply by
confining their offer to an area like this, where there are many
potential customers, there will presumably be a lot of offerings
of this type. In addition to all the difficulties just discussed,
there will continue to be questions of the residence of a particu-
lar purchaser and questions of defining the area.
44. See Sowards, supra note 14, at 296.
45. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 514 (1978). For the text of this section and the compari-
sons with the 1980 draft and the CODE RECOMMENDATION, see note 11 supra. See also
Casper, supra note 11, at 288.
46. Id.
19811
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C. The Small Offering Exemption
The third of these exemptions, the small offering exemp-
tion, reappears in section 512(e)"7 and, lo and behold, is down to
$100,000 again. This time, however, it is not by an act of grace
on the part of the Commission; under the Code, any offering
under $100,000 would be exempt by statute. I am not sure how
much use that is going to be to anybody. It will certainly exempt
really de minimi transactions. But you can't finance much of an
operation with $100,000 these days, so I don't think it has much
practical significance.
VI. Current Administrative Response to the Code
What overall effect has the Code had in this area? I would
suggest that the Code has already had a very important effect on
Commission rulemaking. Two areas I particularly want to focus
on are the changes in the disclosure requirements and the adop-
tion of rule 242.
A. Changes in the Disclosure Requirements
The Commission has recently begun to realize that practical
limitations must be placed on disclosure requirements. 48 This re-
alization has led to the adoption of simplified forms in some in-
stances. One of the earliest simplified forms was form S-7,'
adopted quite a few years ago for very large companies, which
reflects the view that if a company is sufficiently large, very few
things are material enough to require special disclosure. It
greatly simplifies the disclosure required of large companies.
That was followed by another simplified form, S-16, 50 which is
47. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 512(c) (1978). The CODE RECOMMENDATION increases the
exemption from $100,000 to $200,000. For the text of this section and the comparisons
with the 1980 draft and CODE RECOMMENDATION, see note 11 supra.
48. See, e.g., SEC Sec. Act Release No. 6176, 19 SEC Docket 186 (1980); [Current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 82,422. The Commission has proposed "major changes" in-
tended to "reduce disclosure burdens" and to create the integrated disclosure system
"long advocated by many commentators and to reduce current impediments to combin-
ing informal shareholder communications, such as annual reports to shareholders, with
official Commission filings." Id.
49. The text of form S-7 can be found at [1980] 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 7191-
96A.
50. The text of form S-16 can be found at [19801 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99 7291-
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now available to many large companies, even further reducing
the amount of required information. But the large companies
are not the problem here. They have plenty of money and can
pass the cost of registration statements along to their customers.
What about the little fellows who are trying to raise money?
Form S-18 now exists for companies at that end of the scale:5' a
small nonreporting company, offering up to $5,000,000, can dis-
close on a simplified form and can file in a regional office. But
even though there has been simplification for large and small
companies, we now have a category of companies in the middle
who are still saddled with the full panoply of disclosure require-
ments under form S-1. I assume at some point it is going to oc-
cur to the Commission that, if form S-18 is adequate for offer-
ings up to $5,000,000 by small companies, it may also be
adequate for larger offerings.
B. Changes in the Small Offering Exemption
Another change is the expanded use by the Commission of
its rule-making authority under section 3(b) to exempt small of-
ferings. Rule 240,'2 which was adopted by the Commission in
1975, gives a complete exemption for an offering of up to
$100,000 as long as the securities don't wind up being held by
more than 100 people. This rule contains no sophistication re-
quirements and no requirements as to information to be sup-
plied. This was a significant step, but, because limited to
$100,000, it was one that will not be of use in most cases.
The really significant change is rule 242,'s adopted by the
Commission in 1980. The rule, in effect, enacts, with modifica-
tions, section 2425 of the proposed Code for offerings up to
95.
51. The text of form S-18 can be found at [1980] 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. CCH I1 7301-
07. The SECOND ANNUAL SECURrrs UPDATE summarized the findings of the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Monitoring Report on the use of Form S-18 in 1979 which
found that Form S-18 "has substantially displaced Form S-1 as a means of registering
smaller initial public offerings of common stock." The monitoring report also found that
issuers who filed in regional offices were able to file with shorter processing timis than
those who filed at the Commission's Headquarters office. Beach, Form S-18-A Monitor-
ing Report on its Use in 1979, in SECOND ANNUAL SECURITIES UPDATE 213 (1980).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1980)
53. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1980).
54. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 242 (1978). For the text of this section and the compari-
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$2,000,000 (which of course is the Congressionally imposed limit
under section 3(b) as currently in effect). 5 Essentially, it follows
the pattern of section 242, but is more liberal in one respect.
Under rule 242, up to $2,000,000 of securities can be offered to
any number of institutions, to any number of people who
purchase $100,000 or more, and to as many as thirty-five other
people. There are no requirements for supplying information to
institutions or to other purchasers of over $100,000. Any other
purchasers must be given the offeror's most recent annual report
or definitive proxy statement or other comparable material if the
offeror is a reporting company; if it is a nonreporting company,
the offeror must supply the information required by part 1 of
form S-18. This looks to me like a flexible way of distinguishing
between sophisticated and nonsophisticated offerees: if you
choose to include, as offerees, noninstitutional investors or peo-
ple who do not have $100,000, then you must furnish them with
certain information. This is very close to section 242 of the
Code, but it preserves more flexibility because it is a Commis-
sion rule. The Commission can see what happens and can loosen
or tighten the rule in light of future experience. The most seri-
ous problem of the Code approach, in this as in other areas, is
that specific tests would be written into the statute. Congress
can strike a general balance. It can determine to require full dis-
closure, so that people won't buy things that they don't under-
stand; on the other hand, it can decide to provide some leeway
for people to offer without going through incredible difficulties.
Congress can make that judgment. But for Congress to draw the
precise line, and to keep changing that line as conditions change,
is very difficult. Congress simply does not have the ability to
keep up in that way. Congress could simply give the Commission
power to adjust the dollar limit in accordance with inflation,
which would make adjustment automatic. But if they write pro-
visions like section 242 and section 514 into the law, there they
will sit, and the Commission will wind up, just as it did under
the 1933 Act, writing a lot of rules and interpretations just to get
around obstacles imposed by the statute.
sons with the 1980 draft and CODE RECOMMENDATION, see note 11 supra.
55. Sowards, supra note 14, at 295-96.
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VII. Conclusion
To summarize, I would agree with Professor Sowards that
the prospects for adoption of the Code in anything like its pre-
sent form are dubious and far off in the distance. But perhaps
that does not matter too much. It may be that the drafting of
the Code, the distribution of the Code, and the discussions of
the Code with the Commission have had enough of an impact
that we have already accomplished more than we would under
the new Code which, as I have said, proposes new rigid statutory
formulae.
VIII. Discussion
Professor Sowards: Can I just ask you to comment on man-
ners of resale both under rule 242 and proposed section 242?
How can you resell securities that you take under rule 242
today?
Professor Ratner: Under rule 242 they are restricted, sub-
ject to resale in accordance with rule 144. Rule 144 has now been
loosened up to the extent that I think that it provides a pretty
broad avenue for the distribution of securities, as long as you
meet the current public information test, which might be a
problem for companies that are not filing current information. I
do not think anybody is willing at this point to permit unregu-
lated distribution of securities of companies that are not filing.
Also, you can only resell so long as the offeree group remains
limited.
Question: Do you recommend passage of the Code to pro-
vide flexibility in the administration of the securities laws?
Professor Ratner: I think flexibility has been probably the
best and the worst thing about the Securities and Exchange
Commission's administration of the securities laws. In some ar-
eas, the flexibility has operated in such a way that the statute
makes sense in terms of what is really occurring. This is true in
the disclosure area at present. In other areas, the Commission's
flexibility has worked very badly. I think Mr. Spencer has quite
rightly pointed to a number of areas in which the Commission
simply went way beyond their statutory powers because they felt
they had to do so to protect the public interest.
One of the problems of the Code, and Professor Loss him-
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self has said this, is that the drafters are shooting at a moving
target. One of the initial reasons for the Code was that Commis-
sion and court interpretations had simply gone way beyond the
original language of the statutes. That was true from 1967 to
1969, the period of the most expansive interpretations. The
Commission had interpreted its rules broadly and had written
rules under the anti-fraud sections governing practices that
might be considered unfair but could hardly be considered
fraud. The Commission had extended its powers under the pro-
visions for acceleration of registration statements to require not
only disclosure but the famous "undertakings not to enforce in-
demnification provisions," which really had no legitimate statu-
tory foundation.
In the intervening ten years, the courts have cut back a lot
on the Commission's powers. The Supreme Court has pulled
back in many substantive areas, and the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has been pulling the Commission in on
a tighter rein in terms of the burden of proof and the standards
to be applied in administrative proceedings. There has been a
tightening all along the line. I have mixed feelings about the
trend. I think in some areas the courts have pulled back to the
point where they have cut the heart out of some really useful
provisions of the securities law.
What started off in 1969 in Professor Loss's proposal as ei-
ther a codification or a restriction on Commission power, there-
fore, becomes in the present context a substantial extension of
Commission power. That is something more than codification,
and you have to look at it on a case-by-case basis to see whether
that flexibility is needed. I urged earlier that flexibility is useful
in the area of exemptions because the situations change con-
stantly, I think it is a lot more questionable in some of the areas
described by Mr. Lowenfels.
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